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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
CASE NO. E-1981 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
SUSAN 6. WHITELEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
(LAUREN DE SOLE of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER Of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York - Unified Court System (UCS) to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing, in relevant part, its application for the 
designation of certain employees who are represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) as managerial or confidential in accordance with the 
criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act).^ 
^Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any 
person holding a position by appointment or employment in the 
service of a public employer, except that such term shall not 
include for the purposes of any provision of this article other 
than sections two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this 
article,...persons...who may reasonably be designated from time 
to time as managerial or confidential upon application of the 
public employer to the appropriate board....Employees may be 
(Footnote cont'd on next page.) 
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The UCS seeks the designation as managerial or confidential 
of Andrew Klein - Consultation Clerk, Court of Appeals; John P. 
Asiello - Assistant Consultation Clerk, Court of Appeals; William 
J. Hooks - Assistant State Reporter; Leland S. Scopp - Chief 
Appellate Court Attorney, Appellate Division, First Department; 
William Barkan - Deputy Chief Appellate Court Attorney, Appellate 
Division, First Department; Hal Lieberman - Chief Attorney, 
Grievance Committee, Appellate Division, First Department; Susan 
Garry - Chief Appellate Court Attorney, Appellate Division, 
Second Department; Susan H. Harkavy, Deputy Chief Appellate 
Attorney, Appellate Division, Second Department; and James E. 
Pelzer - Supervisor of Decision Department, Second Department.^ 
(Footnote 1 cont'd.) 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who 
formulate policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required on behalf 
of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation for 
and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in 
the administration of agreements or in personnel administration 
provided that such role is not of a routine or clerical nature 
and requires the exercise of independent judgment. Employees may 
be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist 
and act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees 
described in clause (ii)." 
-'CSEA consented to the designation of Marjorie S. McCoy, Chief 
Court Attorney, Court of Appeals, and Craig D. Peterson, Chief 
Appellate Court Attorney, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
as managerial. The Director designated them managerial on the 
basis of that stipulation and facts which arguably supported the 
designation. No exceptions have been filed as to those two 
designations and they are, therefore, not before us. We only 
note that the Director's decision designating these two titles 
was based upon the factual averments of the duties and 
responsibilities as set forth in the application which may 
support the designation sought as stipulated to by the parties. 
When an application is contested, a managerial or confidential 
designation may only be based on evidence of job duties as 
established on the record. 
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The UCS is comprised of the Court of Appeals, four Appellate 
Divisions of the Supreme Court^7, a Supreme Court in each 
county, a state-wide Court of Claims, a County Court in each 
county outside New York City, a Family Court in each county and 
in New York City, a Surrogate's Court in each county, Civil and 
Criminal Courts of the City of New York, District Courts of 
Nassau and Suffolk counties, and City, Town and Village Courts. 
UCS' mission is to resolve claims and disputes and regulate 
the conduct and discipline of the lawyers who are admitted to 
practice in New York. The methods and means of carrying out this 
mission are determined by the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, the 
Administrative Board of the Courts and the Judicial Conference. 
The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is, by virtue of 
that position, the Chief Judge of the State of New York (Chief 
Judge). The Chief Judge appoints the Chief Administrative Judge 
of the Courts (Chief Administrative Judge) to oversee the daily 
administration and operation of UCS and perform duties delegated 
by the Chief Judge and required by law. The Administrative Board 
of the Courts (Administrative Board) consists of the Chief Judge 
and the presiding justices of each of the four Appellate 
-'The Appellate Divisions are responsible for the administration 
of their respective courts and of the several Appellate Auxiliary 
Operations: Candidate Fitness, Attorney Discipline, Assigned 
Counsel, Law Guardians and Mental Hygiene Legal Service. 
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Divisions of Supreme Court.-7 The Chief Judge consults with the 
Administrative Board concerning the establishment of 
administrative standards and policy to be utilized throughout the 
court system. The Board's recommendations are conveyed by the 
Chief Judge to the Court of Appeals, which then establishes 
state-wide policies and standards concerning personnel practices, 
administrative methods and other matters of general application 
to the UCS. 
The Judicial Conference of the State of New York (Judicial 
Conference) is comprised of the Chief Judge, the presiding 
justices of the four Appellate Divisions, one trial justice of 
the Supreme Court from each of the State's four judicial 
departments, one judge each from the Court of Claims, County 
Court, Surrogate's Court, Family Court, Civil Court and Criminal 
Court of the City of New York, one judge of a City Court outside 
New York City, one judge of a District Court, one justice of a 
Town or Village Court, and one member of the bar from each 
Judicial Department. The Judicial Conference is responsible for 
recommending changes in laws, statutes, and rules relating to 
practice, advising the Chief Judge as to educational programs and 
consulting with the Chief Judge as to the administration of the 
court system. 
^The Administrative Board also consults with the Chief 
Administrative Judge regarding the adoption of rules regulating 
practice and procedure in the courts. 
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As we determined in a prior decision concerning a UCS 
application to designate certain employees as managerial or 
confidential: 
The mission of the Unified Court System may fairly be 
described as the administration and implementation of a 
system or structure by which judicial business can be 
efficiently dispatched and justice thereby served. 
Decisions regarding the methods of accomplishing this 
mission are...vested by Article 6, Section 28 of the 
State Constitution and Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law 
in the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the Chief 
Administrator of the Courts, the Administrative Board 
of the Courts, the Judicial Conference, and certain of 
their designees. Indeed, Article 7-A of the Judiciary 
Law contains a lengthy list of subjects in regard to 
which "the chief judge, after consultation with the 
administrative board, shall establish standards and 
administrative policies for general application to the 
unified court system throughout the state....11 
(footnote omitted) It contains a similarly detailed 
list of the chief administrator's functions as 
supervisor of the "administration and operation of the 
unified court system." (footnote omitted) Related 
functions and powers are prescribed for the 
administrative board and the judicial conference, 
(footnote omitted) Decisions made with regard to these 
subjects and in furtherance of these powers amount to 
"policy" formulation within the meaning of §201.7(a) 
(i). These decisions provide the institutional 
framework within which the daily business of the 
judiciary is conducted.-7 
The Director determined, based upon the decision-making 
hierarchy of the UCS and the specific duties of the at-issue 
employees, that none of the at-issue employees were managerial 
because they did not have a major role in determining UCS 
policies, goals or obligations. He found that, while many made 
valuable suggestions for changes in the courts'" rules of 
^State of New York. Unified Court Svs.. 14 PERB 53105, at 3178-
79 (1981), conf'd sub nom. Evans v. PERB. 113 Misc.2d 986, 15 
PERB f7014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1982). 
Board - E-1981 -6 
practice, none of the employees participated with regularity in 
the essential process of determining the goals and objectives of 
the courts.^ He further found that none had a direct role in 
collective bargaining nor a major role in contract or personnel 
administration. The Director likewise determined that none of 
the employees sought to be designated functioned in a 
confidential capacity to a managerial employee with respect to 
collective bargaining or contract or personnel administration. 
The UCS excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that 
each of the at-issue employees is managerial because they 
participate directly in the decision-making process and, with the 
exception of Klein and Asiello, they play an active role in 
personnel administration beyond the exercise of mere routine 
supervision. These employees, the UCS argues further, are 
confidential because they are privy to discussions of personnel 
matters that transcend their supervisory role. CSEA supports the 
Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and a consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
The Director determined that Hooks, Scopp, Barkan, 
Lieberman, Garry, Harkavy and Pelzer are responsible for the day-
to-day operation of their respective departments, finding that, 
while they make recommendations to those in higher authority, 
such as the presiding judges, the clerks of the court, committees 
See Citv of Binahamton, 12 PERB ^3099 (1979). 
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of judges and others, their responsibilities are those of high-
level supervisors. He likewise found that Klein and Asiello did 
not regularly and directly participate in discussions in which 
court policy was set, although they did offer valuable technical 
support. 
Scopp is the Chief Appellate Court Attorney, Appellate 
Division, First Department. He supervises and manages that 
court's legal research staff, including its thirty attorneys. 
His office is responsible for the preparation of reports and 
summaries of cases to be given to the judges for review prior to 
oral argument on the cases. As a result, he researches and 
analyzes complex legal issues, often consulting with attorneys on 
complex proceedings. He performs his responsibilities under the 
supervision and direction of the presiding justice and the Clerk 
of the Appellate Division, First Department. Scopp screens 
candidates for law assistant positions and makes his 
recommendations to the presiding justice and the personnel 
committee of Appellate Division justices. He also assigns legal 
research work and makes recommendations as to the granting or 
withholding of promotions or the imposition of discipline. Scopp 
has no independent authority in this latter regard, although he 
may make routine decisions involving, for example, the granting 
of vacation requests. He has also developed an amendment to the 
court's rules concerning the perfection of appeals in criminal 
cases, which was adopted by the court. 
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Barkan performs functions similar to Scopp, although he has 
no responsibility with respect to any disciplinary action taken 
against any employee. 
Garry, the Chief Appellate Court Attorney, and Harkavy, the 
Deputy Chief Appellate Court Attorney of the Appellate Division, 
Second Department, head the law department staff of fifty-four 
attorneys. They report to the Deputy Clerk of the Court. Garry 
researches complex legal issues and questions on appeal from 
lower courts in criminal cases and Harkavy does the same with 
civil cases before the court. They were responsible for 
implementing a plan developed by the presiding justice and the 
Administrative Board in 1993 to reduce the backlog of pending 
cases. They both screen applicants for employment, attend 
interviews and make recommendations for appointment of new 
employees as well as occasionally express opinions concerning 
work performance of current staff. Garry and Harkavy are also 
members of a senior staff group which meets once every several 
months with the presiding justice to discuss staff issues. The 
opinions of the group are relayed to the judges on the personnel 
committee of the court, although there is no record evidence as 
to whether any of the group's suggestions have been acted upon by 
the committee. 
Hooks, the Assistant State Reporter, Law Reporting Bureau, 
reports directly to the State Reporter and the Deputy State 
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Reporter.-7 Under their supervision, he oversees the editing of 
decisions and preparation of headnotes by the Law Reporting 
Bureau of the Court of Appeals. He trains and supervises legal 
editors and evaluates and counsels staff, reviewing job 
applicants and recommending hiring to the State Reporter. Hooks 
also reviews and assembles documentation for the State Reporter's 
submission of the Bureau's annual budget request. The Court of 
Appeals makes all final decisions on the Bureau's budget, and 
determines the hiring and promotion of Bureau employees. 
Lieberman is the Chief Attorney of the Grievance Committee, 
Appellate Division, First Department, which is responsible for 
the investigation and prosecution of matters involving alleged 
misconduct by attorneys and the imposition of attorney 
discipline. The committee consists of forty-four volunteers 
appointed by the Court for three-year terms and is headed by a 
policy committee. Lieberman supervises the Office of Chief 
Counsel, with nineteen attorneys and support staff. He reports 
to the policy committee and oversees the legal work of the 
office. Preparation of the committee's proposed annual budget is 
Lieberman's responsibility, within the guidelines set by UCS. He 
meets with a UCS budget representative to discuss the budget 
proposal once annually and then makes any adjustments required by 
UCS. Lieberman has made several program recommendations to the 
^Both the State Reporter and the Deputy State Reporter were 
previously designated managerial, on stipulation. State of New 
York, Unified Court Svs.. 15 PERB f4029 (1982) and 22 PERB 
f4000.06 (1989). 
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policy committee, including the creation of an ethics and 
mediation program, a computerized system to be used in the 
attorney discipline process and a request for additional staff. 
He recommends candidates for appointment, proposes promotional 
review for staff and consults about disciplinary action with the 
Clerk or Deputy Clerk of the Court-7, though he may not take any 
such action independently. 
James Pelzer is the Supervisor of the decision department, 
Appellate Division, Second Department. He is responsible for 
reviewing and editing orders, decisions and opinions of the court 
prior to their issuance. Pelzer supervises a small legal staff 
and carries out other administrative functions, including 
supervising the library and computer department, reviewing orders 
to show cause and advising lawyers and pro se litigants. He is a 
member of the staff group which includes Garry and Harkavy. 
Pelzer reviews resumes for employment candidates, interviews them 
and makes recommendations to the presiding justice. 
Klein is the Consultation Clerk for the Court of Appeals and 
Asiello is the Assistant Consultation Clerk. Both operate under 
the general direction of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.27 
^The Deputy Clerk, Appellate Division, First Department was 
previously designated managerial, on stipulation. State of New 
York. Unified Court Svs.. 18 PERB f4000.35 (1985). 
2/The Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Chief Motion Clerk, Deputy 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Law Clerk to the Chief Judge, Law 
Clerk to Court of Appeals Judge, Principal Law Clerk, Senior Law 
) Clerk to the Chief Judge, and Senior Law Clerk to Court of 
Appeals Judge have all previously been designated managerial. 
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When the court is in session, the judges meet daily for 
approximately two and one-half hours to discuss the cases pending 
before them. Klein and Asiello give procedural advice to the 
Court and they are consulted by the clerk, deputy clerk and staff 
attorneys to resolve or give an opinion on jurisdiction, 
reviewability and appealability of cases appealed to the Court of 
Appeals. They prepare bench notes for the judges, which are 
synopses of the facts and issues of law presented in each case, 
as well as a recitation of what the lower courts held in the 
case. During the case conferences they are note takers, 
recording actions, decisions and arguments of the judges. They 
also prepare a digest of all decisions without opinion of the 
Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the direction of the Court, Klein 
and Asiello also prepare a conference calendar and a motion 
calendar. For a short time during each conference, the judges 
may discuss a variety of administrative matters, including 
proposed amendments to the court's rules, staffing and proposed 
legislation. Overall administrative matters, including the UCS 
budget, staffing, and discipline are discussed by the judges 
during executive sessions, which Klein and Asiello do not attend. 
We have previously held: 
To formulate policy is to participate with 
regularity in the essential process involving 
the determination of the goals and objectives 
of the government involved, and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and 
objectives that have a substantial impact 
upon the affairs and the constituency of the 
government. The formulation of policy does 
not extend to the determination of methods of 
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operation that are merely of a technical 
nature.^7 
The record clearly shows that none of the at-issue employees 
participates at a high level and with regularity in the 
formulation of policy. They may make suggestions or provide 
technical information about policy decisions to be made by the 
judges and they implement policy once it is formulated, but they 
do not have the authority to effect policy changes without the 
requisite approval by a higher authority.117 
The at-issue employees do not have any collective bargaining 
responsibility. Likewise, none play a managerial role in 
contract or personnel administration. They may not, in the 
exercise of their supervisory authority, alter the UCS's 
procedure of operation.^7 Their responsibilities are those of 
high-level supervisors, including granting requests for time off, 
recommending employees for promotion or making recommendations 
for the hiring of new employees. They are not, therefore, 
managerial employees within the meaning of the Act. 
Finally, none work in a confidential capacity to an employee 
who is managerial by virtue of collective bargaining or contract 
or personnel administration responsibilities.—7 Any 
^
7City of Binahamton. 12 PERB 53099, at 3185 (1979). 
^See State of New York. Unified Court Svs.. 17 PERB fl4020, 
affid, 17 PERB 13079 (1984). 
^Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York. 15 
PERB 13031 (1982). 
^Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist.. 21 PERB f3047 (1979). 
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information they are exposed to comes to them by virtue of their 
fulfillment of their supervisory responsibilities, an 
insufficient basis for a confidential designation. They have 
access to information which is of bureau or department-wide, but 
not agency-wide, significance. Such limited knowledge does not 
encompass labor management relations information significant to 
the basic mission of the employer.—/ Neither is their limited 
involvement in budget preparation supportive of confidential 
designation.—' 
For the reasons set forth above, UCS's exceptions are denied 
and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the application must be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
&L1 A-r-
R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Mdrc K. Abbott, Member 
J^See City of Newburcrh, 16 PERB 13053 (1983). 
•^See East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 16 PERB f3027 (1983). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1342, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17257 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO SYSTEM, 
INC., 
Respondent. 
REDEN & O'DONNELL (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
ERNEST J. GAWINSKI, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 1342 (ATU) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (AU) on its charge against the Niagara 
Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. (Metro). ATU alleges that 
Metro violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it contracted with a private company 
for the installation of an electronic burner control device on a 
heating boiler in one of Metro's garages. After a hearing, the 
ALJ dismissed the charge. Opining that this case did not fit 
easily within the analysis required by Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority^ (hereafter Niagara), the ALJ 
dismissed the charge upon a finding that the schematic drawings 
1718 PERB f3083 (1985). 
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necessary to the correct installation of the control device were 
not available to Metro. Lacking those drawings, unit employees 
could not install the electronic control unit. On those "very 
narrow facts", the ALJ held that Metro's contract for the 
installation of the burner control device did not violate the Act 
because Metro "did not possess the requisite materials or tools 
to enable it to assign the work to an ATU member." 
ATU argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by the 
facts in the record, is contrary to Niagara, and establishes an 
unsound policy which opens a "door to deceptive employer 
practices." 
In response, Metro argues that the ALJ's decision is correct 
for the reasons stated in her opinion, but that in any event, 
dismissal is required under Niagara because ATU unit employees do 
not have exclusivity over this particular work and because the 
installation of this particular device was a type of work 
substantially dissimilar to the work previously done by ATU unit 
employees. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge, but upon 
an application of Niagara. 
We need not decide whether Metro could have obtained the 
required schematics before the burner control unit was 
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installed.-x The record establishes that unit employees have 
never installed a device of this type, had not been trained in 
this type of work prior to the installation at issue, which 
presents substantial safety risks, and that the installation of 
this electronic unit required calibrations, adjustments and, 
possibly, programmings of a type not previously done by unit 
employees. Although the functions of the electrical/mechanical 
burner control device, which was replaced by the electronic unit, 
are the same, that does not mean that the tasks associated with 
the installation of those units are the same. Similarly, tasks 
associated with the adjustment and maintenance of the old burner 
control unit as performed by unit employees are not the same as 
the tasks required for the installation of the new unit. Indeed, 
testimony from ATU witness David Ernst, Supervisor of Facilities 
of the Building and Maintenance Department of Metro, establishes 
that two unit employees were assigned to observe the contractor's 
installation of the electronic control device specifically so 
that they could "obtain knowledge" because they were not 
"familiar with the way the unit works, . . . how it has to be 
programmed . . . [or] with the adjustments that had to be made to 
make sure that the boiler goes through the entire operation 
properly . . . ." 
^There is evidence in the record that Metro made no effort to 
obtain the schematics until after the installation was completed, 
and may have made little effort in that regard even then. 
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Under Niagara, an employer need not negotiate a decision to 
subcontract unit work if the work which is contracted is 
substantially different from the work previously performed by 
unit employees. We are persuaded on this record that the 
installation of this electronic control device involved 
calibration and adjustment tasks which ATU's unit employees had 
not done previously. Our decision is, of course, limited to the 
facts of this case. We do not hold or suggest by this decision 
that a simple difference in equipment design or technology would 
by itself effect a loss of exclusivity or establish a 
dissimilarity in tasks or qualifications sufficient to permit an 
employer to subcontract or otherwise transfer unit work. 
J Similarly, given the basis for our decision, we need not decide 
whether, as Metro claims, ATU unit employees do not have 
exclusivity over the installation of electronic devices of this 
particular type or such devices in general.-7 Nor do we decide 
whether the installation of this unit required qualifications not 
then possessed by ATU unit employees. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AKT's decision 
dismissing the charge is affirmed and ATU's exceptions are 
denied. 
-'The record evidences, for example, that the old burner control 
unit was installed many years ago by employees of the same 
contractor which installed the new unit. Outside contractors 
were also involved in other projects involving the installation 
of other types of digital devices. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline
 XR. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc °k. AbBbtt", Member 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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-and- CASE NO. U-18135 
NEW YORK STATE CANAL CORPORATION, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) on a 
charge filed by CSEA against the New York State Canal Corporation 
(Corporation). CSEA alleges that the Corporation refused its 
demands to negotiate the subjects of uniforms and work clothing 
in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that CSEA had waived any 
further right to negotiate those subjects during the term of the 
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parties' first contract17 by an agreement reached during 
contract negotiations to submit uniform and work clothing issues 
to a labor management committee (LMC) for recommendations. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in holding 
that it waived the right to negotiate uniform and work clothing 
issues following the release of the LMC's recommendations. 
The Corporation argues in response that the exceptions are 
procedurally deficient because the grounds for the exceptions are 
not set forth with sufficient particularity. On the merits, the 
Corporation argues that the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge 
is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
Preliminarily, we hold that the exceptions are in 
satisfactory form under §204.10 of our Rules of Procedure. The 
parts of the ALJ's decision to which exceptions are taken are 
specifically set forth. The second page of the exceptions 
articulates the reasons why CSEA alleges that the ALJ erred in 
reaching her determination, a rationale which is amplified in an 
accompanying brief submitted specifically in support of the 
exceptions. The Corporation's objection to the form of the 
exceptions is, accordingly, denied. 
^The Corporation's employees in CSEA's unit were represented by 
CSEA in a State of New York unit until they were transferred to 
the Corporation in 1992. The CSEA-State contract covered these 
employees through March 31, 1995. The current contract covers 
August 24, 1995 through June 30, 1999. 
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This being these parties' first contract, there were several 
specific proposals concerning work clothing submitted and 
discussed during contract negotiations.27 CSEA's proposal 
regarding work shoes and work gear was accepted by the 
Corporation with some modifications, and CSEA withdrew a proposal 
regarding winter coats, but the parties could not agree to a 
final disposition on CSEA's proposal to have the Corporation 
provide employees with ten sets of workshirts and pants without 
charge to the employees. After extensive discussions yielded no 
agreement on this subject, the parties agreed to what became 
Article 15.4.1 of their final agreement. 
Article 15.4.1 provides as follows: 
Uniforms: The parties agree to establish a joint 
labor/management work clothing committee to review work 
clothing issues and to make recommendations with regard 
to the provisions of uniforms and work clothing. Such 
committee shall report its findings no later than 
December 31, 1995. 
There were admittedly no discussions by the parties as to what 
would happen to the work clothing issues submitted to the LMC 
once the recommendations were made by the LMC. 
After the LMC issued its recommendations in early 1996, CSEA 
sought to "reopen negotiations for the sole purpose of 
negotiating" uniforms and work clothing. In June, the 
Corporation announced a work clothing plan which did not conform 
^Whether the parties were engaged in interest-based or 
traditional negotiations is not material to our analysis for 
there is no waiver of bargaining rights no matter how the 
parties' negotiations are characterized. 
Case No. U-18135 -4 
to the LMC's recommendations. On July 1, 1996, CSEA renewed its 
demand to negotiate, which the Corporation refused because it 
considered "this matter closed pursuant to ... the ... 
agreement". 
This charge is limited to the Corporation's admitted refusal 
to negotiate uniforms arid work clothing pursuant to CSEA's 
demands. On that charge, the ALJ held that Article 15.4.1 of the 
parties' agreement, when considered in light of the parties' 
negotiating history, established that CSEA settled all 
outstanding uniform and work clothing issues which were not 
specifically addressed in the contract by agreeing to receive 
recommendations from a LMC, no matter what those recommendations 
were and no matter what the Corporation elected to do with those 
recommendations. 
The parties correctly recognize that the right and duty to 
negotiate continues during the life of a collective bargaining 
agreement as to all mandatory subjects of negotiation unless 
negotiations have been waived by agreement or otherwise. They 
and the ALJ also correctly recognized that the burden of proof on 
this waiver defense rests with the Corporation, which must 
present facts establishing CSEA's intentional relinquishment of 
its bargaining rights if it is to satisfy that its burden. We 
disagree with the ALT's legal analysis only because it 
effectively shifts the burden of proof to CSEA to establish that 
it did not waive its bargaining rights. 
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There was admittedly no discussion by these parties during 
negotiations as to what would happen upon the release of the 
LMC's recommendations. Although the language of Article 15.4.1 
of the agreement and the negotiating history leading up to it are 
susceptible to the conclusion reached by the ALT, it is at least 
as reasonably susceptible to a conclusion that the parties simply 
agreed to postpone negotiations on open work clothing issues 
until after the LMC released recommendations which might have 
resolved the parties7 underlying disagreements and obviated any 
further need to negotiate those issues. 
Where, as here, the evidence is equally susceptible to two 
different interpretations, one reasonably consistent with a 
waiver of bargaining rights and one not reasonably consistent 
with that conclusion, the Corporation, having the burden of proof 
on the waiver issue, cannot prevail. In such circumstances, the 
waiver cannot be the clear, intentional relinquishment of right 
that it must be-7 if a party is to avoid the State's strong and 
sweeping policy-7 requiring negotiations about all unsettled 
terms and conditions of employment. 
CSEA's failure to secure a specific reservation of a right 
to negotiate after release of the LMC's work clothing 
recommendations is no more consequential than is the 
^CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB f7011 (3d Dep't 1982), 
aff'd following remand, 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB J[7007 (1984). 
^Cohoes City Sch. Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774 
9 PERB J[7529 (1976) . 
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Corporation's equal failure to secure a specific exemption from 
any bargaining obligations upon the release of those 
recommendations. The language of Article 15.4.1, whether read 
within or without the context of the negotiations leading up to 
it, is ambiguous at best and cannot establish a waiver of 
bargaining rights. Therefore, the Corporation violated its duty 
to negotiate when it refused to negotiate the unresolved work 
clothing issues pursuant to CSEA's demands. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, CSEA's 
exceptions are granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Corporation negotiate 
pursuant to CSEA's demands dated April 9, 1996 and July 15, 
1996-7 and sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to CSEA unit employees 
are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
UJv^ O A ^ L 
Paulina^R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
-''Our order, of course, applies only to the extent CSEA's 
proposals made in the negotiations required by this decision are 
mandatorily negotiable and not settled by the parties' agreement 
or otherwise waived. For example, issues regarding safety work 
shoes and work gear, subjects already specifically covered by the 
parties' agreement, would not require further negotiations. 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) that the New York State Canal Corporation will negotiate the subject of work clothing pursuant to CSEA's 
demands dated April 9, 1996 and July 15, 1996. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
NEW YORK STATE CANAL CORPORATION 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES J. COSTIANES, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18995 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
JAMES J. COSTIANES, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by James J. 
Costianes to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., (CSEA) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) in its representation of him in a disciplinary proceeding. 
Costianes was informed by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation that his charge was 
deficient in that he had filed only one copy of his charge^7 and 
the voluminous attachments to it, that the events complained of 
in the charge occurred more than four months prior to the filing 
-'•'Section §204.1(a) (1) of our Rules of Procedure requires that an 
original and four copies of an improper practice charge be filed 
with the Director. 
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of the charge and it was, therefore, untimely,-7 and that CSEA 
did not owe him a duty of fair representation because he had 
resigned from his public employment in December 1994.-
Costianes declined to withdraw the charge and it was subsequently 
dismissed as deficient by the Director. 
Costianes does not allege in his exceptions that the 
Director's decision was in error, either factually or legally. 
The exceptions are basically a restatement of his underlying 
complaints regarding the manner in which his disciplinary 
proceeding was handled by the State and CSEA. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of 
Costianes1 arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Costianes was served with disciplinary charges in early 
1994. He resigned from his employment in December 1994. 
Throughout the disciplinary proceeding he was represented by 
CSEA. Since his resignation, Costianes has sought payment for 
his unused sick leave and a review of the underlying disciplinary 
charges against him. 
Any conduct by CSEA alleged to be improper by Costianes 
occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the charge 
in May 1997. That CSEA continued to respond to his letters and 
-''An improper practice charge must be filed within four months of 
its occurrence. Rules, §204.1(a)(1). 
-''costianes had been employed by the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) (State) at the Albion 
Correctional Facility and was in a unit represented by CSEA prior 
to his resignation. 
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telephone calls, denying his requests for additional review or 
continued representation, does not render timely his improper 
practice charge alleging that CSEA's representation of him in 
1994 breached its duty of fair representation. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline^R. Kinsella, Ch airperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-17934 
& U-18088 
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charges alleging that the Town of Southampton 
(Town) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally assigned work performed 
by CSEA unit employees to nonunit employees. The Town raised 
several affirmative defenses, including timeliness, jurisdiction 
and waiver. As to both charges, the Town also alleged that CSEA 
lacked exclusivity over the work at issue. 
The ALJ held that PERB had jurisdiction over the alleged 
violations, but found that CSEA lacked exclusivity over the work 
in issue and dismissed the charges. CSEA excepts to the AKT's 
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decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that there was no 
discernible boundary around the transferred work which would 
distinguish it from the work that had been performed by nonunit 
employees. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The Town's Sanitation Department operates transfer stations 
at Sag Harbor, Westhampton Beach and Hampton Beach. Until 
December 1995, the Town also operated the North Sea landfill. 
The permit for the North Sea landfill expired in December 1995, 
and the Town converted the landfill to a transfer station, 
eliminating two full-time unit positions effective December 31, 
1995. -' 
On or about March 11, 1996, the Town began assigning work at 
the North Sea transfer station to seven nonunit, part-time 
employees. This action is the subject of the charge in U-17394. 
While it was operated as a landfill, North Sea was the only 
location that accepted commercial debris, which was weighed on 
scales operated by CSEA unit employees. CSEA unit employees also 
sold garbage bags to the public at North Shore. In addition, 
these unit employees took readings from the leachate tank-; at 
-The two employees, Kevin Gilbride, a sanitation crew leader, 
and Louis Reardon, a sanitation guard, were laid off on December 
30, 1995. 
-''Leachate is the liquid run-off from the landfill which goes 
into wells and is then pumped from the wells into the leachate 
tank. 
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North Shore and ran the pump which removed liquid from the wells 
into the leachate tank. 
The record establishes that nonunit employees have collected 
refuse at the three other transfer stations and ascertained the 
charges which the public must pay for the disposal of that 
garbage, a charge assessed on the number of bags of garbage, not 
the weight of the garbage. In addition, both unit and nonunit 
employees have sold garbage bags to the public at the Town's 
transfer stations and the garbage bags may also be purchased at 
privately owned stores. Pumps, though not used with a leachate 
tank, are located at the Town's other transfer stations and have 
been operated by both unit and nonunit personnel and the gauges 
associated with them are read by both unit and nonunit employees. 
There also have been occasions at North Shore when nonunit 
employees have done work on the pumps and the leachate tank. 
Apart from the work done at the North Shore landfill site, 
CSEA unit employees performed related work in the woods adjacent 
to the landfill. When papers and refuse blew into those woods, 
CSEA unit employees were responsible for cleaning up those papers 
and refuse. However, paper and refuse along the perimeter of the 
woods has been removed by both nonunit employees and community 
service individuals.-7 On one occasion in 1990, the Town rented 
bulldozers and a small bucket tractor for more extensive cleanup 
of the wooded area. This equipment was operated by CSEA unit 
-''These individuals were, apparently, honor inmates from a nearby 
correctional facility. 
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employees. On June 26, 1996, the Town contracted with the 
private contractors from whom it had previously only rented this 
equipment to perform an extensive removal of paper from the 
wooded area adjacent to North Shore. The contractors utilized 
their own employees and equipment and it is this action which is 
the subject of the charge in U-18088. 
The ALT dismissed both charges, finding that CSEA lacked 
exclusivity over the work in issue. CSEA argues to us that a 
discernible boundary should be drawn around the work unit 
employees performed at the North Shore landfill, specifically, 
operating the scales, selling garbage bags, operating and taking 
readings from the leachate tank, and, finally, cleaning papers 
^ from within the woods adjacent to North Shore. Tested within 
such a boundary, CSEA claims that it has established and 
maintained exclusivity. 
The work of the unit is the receiving, handling and disposal 
of trash and refuse, both commercial and private, from the 
public. For some time, that work has been performed by full-time 
unit employees, nonunit part-time employees, private contractors 
and community service workers, at all locations. The nature of 
the trash and the method used to ascertain the charge for its 
disposal do not provide a sufficient basis by which to define 
unit work.^ While operating the scales at North Shore was 
performed by unit employees, that work is similar to receiving 
refuse and ascertaining the cost of disposal done by nonunit 
\ 
i 
^Town of Brookhaven, 27 PERB 53063 (1994). 
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employees at the transfer stations. Nonunit employees sell the 
same garbage bags at the Town's transfer stations as have been 
sold at North Shore. While nonunit employees have not read the 
gauges of the leachate pump at North Shore, they have performed 
work on that pump, as well as operating pumps and reading gauges 
at the Town's other transfer stations. Even though on one 
occasion unit employees operated equipment to remove papers and 
refuse from the woods adjacent to North Shore, nonunit employees 
and others, working both in the woods and on the perimeter, 
picked up papers and refuse with pitchforks and shovels. 
Although urged to do so by CSEA, we decline to utilize only the 
circumstances in which nonunit individuals have not done unit 
work to define the unit work even though such a narrow definition 
would allow CSEA's unit employees to maintain the exclusivity 
necessary over the work here in issue.-7 "We have not recognized 
a discernible boundary when we have been unable to identify a 
reasonable relationship between the components of the discernible 
boundary and the duties of the unit employees. "^ Here, there 
is no reasonable relationship between the work performed by the 
unit employees and the boundaries to unit work which CSEA urges 
us to recognize, because identical, or at least substantially 
similar, work has been performed for some time by nonunit 
employees of the Town and other persons. 
5/See Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist., 26 PERB 53075 (1993). 
^Id. at 3145. 
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We, therefore, dismiss CSEA's exceptions and affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
Dated: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
U^U^l 
Pauline, R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN ANTHONY BARTOLINI, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-19051 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS' 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
JOHN ANTHONY BARTOLINI, Pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed„by John Anthony 
Bartolini to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
against the Westchester County Correction Officers' Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (COBA). Bartolini alleges that COBA breached 
its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, in 
May 1997, it refused his request for representation in a federal 
civil rights lawsuit he wanted commenced to overturn his 
termination from employment with the County of Westchester 
(County) in March 1995.-17 COBA refused Bartolini's request 
^For purposes of this decision, we are accepting as true 
Bartolini's allegation that he was terminated from employment in 
March 1995. Bartolini, however, may have resigned or abandoned 
his employment in 1994 to attend college. 
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because he was then no longer employed by the County and he was 
not a member of COBA. 
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that COBA 
did not owe any representation duty to Bartolini in May 1997 
because he had waited too long after his termination from 
employment in March 1995 to request COBA's representation. 
Bartolini argues in his exceptions that he did not know 
until May 1997 that there exists what he characterizes as a 
"retainer agreement" in which COBA's attorney allegedly agreed to 
represent unit employees in federal lawsuits. Bartolini argues 
that his having waited until 1997 to request legal assistance 
from COBA was reasonable. Bartolini alleges that this "retainer 
agreement" obligates COBA to represent him as he requested in May 
1997 and that he should be allowed to prove at a hearing that 
COBA's refusal to commence the federal litigation was motivated 
by reasons which are arbitrary, discriminatory and advanced in 
bad faith. 
Having considered Bartolini's arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
A union's duty of fair representation springs from its 
status under the Act as the exclusive negotiating agent for a 
unit of employees. The statutory grant of exclusivity to the 
bargaining agent entitles it to represent all persons in the 
unit, whether or not they choose to become members of the union, 
but it also imposes upon that union an obligation to represent 
all of those employees fairly, impartially and in good faith. 
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But the union's duty is owed only to the persons it represents. 
When an employee's employment relationship is severed, the 
union's representation duties to that former employee end, except 
in circumstances in which the severance from employment is being 
contested or there is some other basis upon which to conclude 
that there is a continuing nexus to employment notwithstanding 
the individual's relinquishment or loss of employment.a/ For 
example, if Bartolini had voluntarily resigned or abandoned his 
position, COBA would clearly not owe him thereafter any duty of 
fair representation.-7 Just as clearly, if Bartolini was 
discharged in March 1995, and had then sought COBA's help with a 
proceeding to reclaim his position, COBA might have owed him a 
duty of fair representation. Of controlling significance to the 
Director, and to us, is that Bartolini did not seek COBA's 
assistance until 1997, more than two years after he was allegedly 
discharged from employment. Just as a union has a duty of fair 
representation to unit employees, those employees who would hold 
a union to its statutory duties have a corresponding obligation 
to seek the union's assistance within a reasonable period of time 
^See City of Albany. 16 PERB f3101 (1983) (union retains right 
and potential duty to represent employee who resigned because an 
arbitration award, rendered on a grievance filed while the 
employee was employed, had not been satisfied by the employer, 
which was seeking to vacate the award). 
^Lanzillo v. PERB. 29 PERB J[7003 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1996), 
conf'g 28 PERB f3048 (1995). Bartolini denies that he resigned 
or abandoned his job and, as noted, we have accepted that 
allegation as true for purposes of this decision. 
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after the action which has prompted the employee's request for 
assistance has occurred. 
Bartolini does not at all argue to the contrary of these 
propositions. He simply claims that his waiting until 1997 to 
contact COBA was reasonable because he did not know about the 
"retainer agreement" until then. 
Even were we to accept Bartolini's conclusory allegation 
that this "retainer agreement" somehow represents COBA's 
willingness or promise to represent unit employees in federal 
civil rights litigation in some undefined circumstances, the 
Director's decision is still properly affirmed. Bartolini did 
not need to know of the existence of this "retainer agreement" as 
a condition to his seeking COBA's assistance in conjunction with 
what he alleges was a discharge from employment which violated 
his constitutional right to due process and his constitutional 
right of free speech. As Bartolini believed that his alleged 
termination from employment in March 1995 violated his civil 
rights, he should have gone to COBA at that date and inquired 
generally as to whether COBA would provide him with 
representation on a civil rights lawsuit to reclaim his job. As 
the Director found, there is no reasonable explanation offered by 
Bartolini for his having waited more than two years after the 
County discharged him before he first sought COBA's assistance 
with a lawsuit to vindicate an alleged violation of his civil 
rights. Under such circumstances, we conclude, as did the 
Director, that COBA did not owe former employee Bartolini any 
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duty of fair representation under the Act on a request in 1997 
for legal assistance to contest an alleged wrongful termination 
from employment in March 1995. To hold to the contrary would 
expose unions and, on many occasions, employers-'' to potential 
liability years after the events in issue took place and years 
after the departure of employees from the bargaining unit 
represented by the union. Such a result is clearly inconsistent 
with the policies of the Act which favor the prompt initiation 
and resolution of allegations of statutory impropriety. As the 
Court of Appeals has observed, it is "obviously desirable that 
labor disputes be resolved expeditiously."^ The statutory 
system for the regulation of the complex labor relationships 
among employers, employees and unions can, as the Court of 
Appeals has also observed, "become unworkable"-7 if decisions by 
the parties to a bargaining relationship could be called into 
question years after those decisions were made. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and Bartolini's exceptions are denied. 
^Section 209-a.3 of the Act requires employers to be joined as 
parties to any duty of fair representation charge stemming from 
the processing or failure to process a claim that the employer 
has breached its agreement with a union. Section 205.5(d) of the 
Act empowers us to order appropriate remedial relief against 
employers in such cases. 
^Baker v. W. Irondecruoit Cent. Sch. Dist. . 70 N.Y.2d 314, 322 
(1987) . 
^Id. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Paul ine ,^ . iKirisella, "Chairperson 
i / 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18956 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
RAYMOND 6. KRUSE, ESQ., for charging Party 
MICHAEL W. WITTENBERG, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Westchester 
County Police Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a 
decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) conditionally dismissing 
the PBA's charge that the County of Westchester (County) had 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by subcontracting to a private company the transportation 
of juvenile delinquent and juvenile offender detainees. The PBA 
argues that the transport of these detainees is exclusive 
bargaining unit work. The County argues that the work is not 
exclusive to the PBA's unit employees and that the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement covers its action. 
The Assistant Director deferred a decision on the merits of 
the charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure, 
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finding that the parties' collective bargaining agreement was a 
reasonably arguable source of right to the PBA.^7 The PBA 
argues in its exceptions that the charge should not be deferred 
because PERB has jurisdiction over the charge and that it has not 
filed a grievance because it does not consider the contract to be 
applicable to its claim and it should be allowed to choose the 
forum in which it will proceed. The County has not responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
PBA's arguments, we reverse the decision of the Assistant 
Director and remand the matter to him for further proceedings. 
In County of Westchester^7, decided on November 4, 1997, we 
determined that a virtually identical contract clause-7, albeit 
in a collective bargaining agreement between the County and the 
bargaining agent for a different unit of County employees, was a 
reasonably arguable source of right to the union. We decided 
Article 1.6 of the parties' 1995-96 contract provides: 
MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS 
Conditions of employment in effect prior to this 
agreement and not covered by this agreement shall not 
be reduced without good cause during the term of this 
agreement. "Good cause" may be determined through the 
grievance procedure herein, including Step 3. 
30 PERB f3059 (1997). 
The contract clause in that case provided: 
Rates of pay, hours of work, and conditions of 
employment in effect prior to the Agreement and not 
covered by the agreement shall not be reduced without 
good cause during the term of the Agreement. "Good 
cause" may be determined through the grievance 
procedure herein, including step 4. 
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there that, while we had jurisdiction over the charges^7, merits 
deferral to the parties7 contractual grievance procedure, which 
ended in binding arbitration, was appropriate because disposition 
of the charges required an interpretation of the parties' 
contract and a grievance might be dispositive of the underlying 
dispute. -7 
Here, the contract clause in issue is in the nature of a 
general past practice clause over which we have jurisdiction, 
whether or not the parties7 contract is in effect.^7 Therefore, 
the Assistant Director erred in deferring this charge under 
Herkimer County BOCES-7 because that decision establishes the 
basis for a deferral of jurisdictional questions. There is no 
jurisdictional issue presented by this charge. As the contract 
is a source of right to the PBA in relevant respect, a merits 
deferral may be appropriate. However, a review of the record 
reveals that grievances under Article 1.6 of the parties' January 
1, 1995 to December 31, 1996 collective bargaining agreement may 
be "determined through the grievance procedure... including Step 
3" .& Our review of the contract reveals that while the 
parties7 contractual grievance procedure ends in binding 
^Citv of Saratoga Springs. 18 PERB fl3009 (1985). 
^Town of Carmel. 29 PERB 13073 (1996). 
-'City of Saratoga Springs, supra. 
z/20 PERB ^3050 (1987) . 
-
7We take administrative notice of the parties7 contract last 
filed with us pursuant to §214.1 of our Rules of Procedure. 
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arbitration at Step 4, Step 3 is before the County Personnel 
Officer. If grievances filed under Article 1.6 do not end in 
binding arbitration, a merits deferral would not be 
appropriate.-7 If, however, Article 1.6 grievances can be taken 
to Step 4, a merits deferral would be appropriate even though the 
PBA has chosen not to invoke the grievance procedure. 
As we have jurisdiction over this charge, and as a merits 
deferral may be inappropriate, the matter must be remanded to the 
Assistant Director to ascertain if grievances filed under Article 
1.6 are last decided at Step 3 by the Personnel Officer or at 
Step 4, binding arbitration. If the Assistant Director 
determines that Article 1.6 grievances are not subject to 
consideration at Step 4, then the matter must be further 
processed to a decision on the merits. 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the decision of 
the Assistant Director and remand the matter to him for further 
action consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
-'Town of CarmelP supra; New York City Transit Auth., 4 PERB 
f3031 (1971). 
STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GARY WACTOR, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18469 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, LOCAL 1140, 
Respondent, 
-and-
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT OPERATING 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CHARLES MUNAFO, for Charging Party 
COSTA, MCKAY & DONNELLY (RICARDO A. McKAY Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
MARTIN A. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (EVELYN JONAS of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Gary Wactor to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing his 
charge that the United Transportation Union, Local 1440 (UTU) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) in the handling of a grievance and his request for another 
position with his employer, the Staten Island Rapid Transit 
Operating Authority (SIRTOA). The charge also alleges that 
SIRTOA violated §209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act in 
failing to provide information to Wactor and in not allowing him 
to choose his own grievance representative. 
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In his initial processing of the charge, the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
determined that the only allegation against UTU which was timely 
filed pursuant to our Rules of Procedure (Rules) was the UTU's 
alleged failure to keep Wactor informed about the status of his 
grievance and about his attempts to be appointed to a vacant 
machine operator position. As to SIRTOA, the Director determined 
that the charge was untimely and set forth no facts to support a 
finding of a violation of the Act by SIRTOA.-x The matter was 
scheduled for a pre-hearing conference on the timely allegations 
against UTU. At the conference, UTU advised that it would move 
to dismiss the charge and Wactor advised that he would move to 
contest the Director's initial determinations on the processing 
of the charge. The parties stipulated to the facts upon which 
the ALJ's decision on the motions would be based. 
The ALJ denied Wactor's motion that the Director's initial 
determination regarding the extent to which the charge would be 
processed should be set aside, finding that such an action was 
beyond the scope of an ALJ's authority. UTU's motion to dismiss 
the charge against it on the basis of the stipulated record was 
granted by the ALJ, who determined that UTU had not breached its 
duty of fair representation. 
Wactor excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ 
erred on the facts and the law, and introduces several factual 
-'The ALJ, accordingly, did not address and made no findings as 
to the allegations against SIRTOA. 
r^ 
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allegations which were not before the ALJ.-7 The UTU supports 
the ALJ's decision and argues that Wactor's exceptions were 
untimely filed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Initially, we find that the exceptions were timely filed. 
Section 204.10 of our Rules requires that exceptions be filed 
within fifteen working days of receipt of the ALJ's decision. 
Our records indicate that Wactor's representative, Charles 
Munafo, received the ALJ's decision on May 1, 1997.- Exceptions 
were filed by Munafo on May 15, 1997, within the time allowed, 
and they are, therefore, timely filed. 
Turning to the exceptions filed by Munafo, we find that the 
ALJ properly denied Wactor's motion to process the entire charge 
after the Director had initially determined that only part of the 
charge was timely or had sufficient facts alleged to warrant 
further processing. Section 204.2(a) of the Rules provides: 
After a charge is filed, the director shall review the 
charge to determine whether the facts as alleged may 
constitute an improper practice as set forth in section 
209-a of the act. If it is determined that the facts 
as alleged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a 
violation, or that the alleged violation occurred more 
than four months prior to the filing of the charge, it 
shall be dismissed by the director subject to review by 
the board under section 204.10(c) of this Part.... 
( 
-''These claims were not part of the stipulated record and are 
raised for the first time in Wactor's exceptions. They are, 
therefore, not properly before us and will not be considered. 
-'The return receipt received from Wactor does not indicate a 
delivery date. 
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The ALJ has no authority to ignore or, in effect, reverse a 
decision made by the Director during the initial review of a 
charge that certain allegations in the charge will not be 
processed because there are no facts pled in support of the 
allegation or the allegation is untimely on its face.17 
Exceptions to such a decision are properly made to this Board, 
not to the ALJ. 
The charge was filed on December 6, 1996. The allegations 
in the charge relating to events which occurred in June and July, 
1996, are plainly untimely.-7 Based upon our review of the 
charge and the exceptions to the decision of the Director, the 
Director's determination in that respect is affirmed. 
The stipulated record sets forth two alleged violations of 
the Act by UTU. Wactor alleges that he contacted Louis Russo, 
UTU's chairman, on July 18, 1996, about a letter from SIRTOA that 
was placed in his file, and which required him to produce a 
doctor's note for a day he was out sick. Russo spoke with Wactor 
that day and then sent him a letter on August 12, 1996, 
confirming that the matter was being grieved. The letter also 
advised Wactor that Russo, not Charles Munafo-', was the only 
- An ALJ may dismiss all or part of the charge as untimely, even 
after the Director has made an initial determination that the 
charge as filed is timely, if the failure of timeliness is first 
made'evident at a hearing. Wells Cent. Sch. Dist.r 16 PERB f3107 
(1983). 
-
7Rules, §204.1(a) (1). 
-^ Munafo is the vice-chairman of UTU. 
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authorized UTU representative able to file and process grievances 
and that Russo would not be in contact with Munafo, only Wactor. 
After receipt of Russo's letter, Wactor, nonetheless, continued 
to attempt to utilize Munafo's services to process the grievance. 
At the time of the stipulation of facts, the grievance processed 
by Russo was at Step 3 of the contractual grievance procedure. 
These limited facts show that UTU, through Russo, filed and 
processed a grievance on behalf of Wactor. Wactor was kept 
informed by Russo of the status of that grievance. UTU has, 
therefore, not breached the duty of fair representation in this 
matter. That Wactor prefers to deal with Munafo and wanted Russo 
to keep Munafo informed about his grievance is an internal union 
matter, beyond this Board's jurisdiction.^ The ALJ's dismissal 
of this aspect of the charge is affirmed. 
Wactor also alleges that UTU did not keep him informed about 
its efforts on his behalf in obtaining appointment to a machine 
operator position. However, the record shows that the last time 
Wactor questioned UTU about the status of this matter was June 
1996. Russo replied to Wactor that he was still working on it. 
Wactor made no further requests for information. The last 
request for information made by Wactor was answered by Russo in 
June 1996, more than four months prior to the filing of the 
instant charge. This allegation is, therefore, untimely. In 
addition, no refusal to provide information has been established 
2/S_ee United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2f 15 PERB f4588, aff 'd, 15 
PERB f3114 (1982). 
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in this record. Wactor's requests for information have been 
answered. That, in the absence of requests for information since 
June 1996, UTU has not volunteered any additional information 
does not violate UTU's duty of fair representation. An employee 
organization has an obligation to answer requests from unit 
employees for information about the processing of grievances or 
other actions taken by the employee organization on an employee's 
behalf, but the duty of fair representation does not extend to an 
obligation that the organization seek an employee out with 
periodic status reports. 
As to SIRTOA, Wactor alleged that a SIRTOA representative, 
on July 18, 1996, while handing him a letter requiring him to 
obtain a doctor's note, told him to see Russo because he knew all 
about the letter. Wactor claims this was an attempt by SIRTOA to 
compel him to choose Russo as his union representative. As this 
alleqation concerns an incident which occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the improper practice charge, it 
was determined by the Director to be untimely and we confirm that 
determination. Wactor's other allegations against SIRTOA, 
although timely, relate to SIRTOA's alleged failure to provide 
him with information about his grievance pursuant to Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL) requests. Even if Wactor was entitled to 
information from SIRTOA regarding the grievance being processed 
by Russo, an allegation that FOIL is being violated does not make 
out a violation of the Act. 
J 
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Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
ilind/l&. Kinsella, i Chairperson 
Marc* A. Abbott^ Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF WATERTOWN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18672 
WATERTOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
SLYE AND BURROWS (ROBERT J. SLYE of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
DEPERNO, KHANZADIAN, MCGRATH AND LALONDE (ROCCO A. DEPERNO 
and ANN MCGRATH of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Watertown (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge filed by the City against the Watertown Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA). As relevant to these exceptions, 
the City alleges that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it submitted a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation to compulsory interest 
arbitration. The PBA's demand would have any disputes regarding 
the City's determination as to a police officer's eligibility for 
benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c-/ submitted 
for resolution to final and binding arbitration. 
^GML §207-c entitles police officers who are disabled by injury 
or illness incurred in the line of duty to a continuation of 
salary or wages and medical care. 
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The ALJ held the demand mandatory and dismissed the 
charge.-7 According to the ALJ, as GML §207-c benefits are a 
form of wages, the method by which disputes regarding eligibility 
for those wage payments are resolved is itself mandatorily 
negotiable. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found nothing 
in any statute or public policy which would prohibit negotiations 
regarding a demand for arbitration of an employer's GML §207-c 
eligibility determination or which would evidence a plain and 
clear legislative intent to render such a demand a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
The City argues that review of its GML §207-c eligibility 
determination can only be had under Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(CPLR) Article 78. According to the City, a demand for review of 
that eligibility determination by an arbitrator is at least a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation, if not prohibited. 
The PBA argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
plainly correct and should be affirmed for the reasons stated in 
the ALJ's decision. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The PBA concedes that the City has the right to make the 
initial GML §207-c eligibility determination. Its demand does 
not affect that initial determination by the City. The City for 
-'The ALJ dismissed allegations regarding another PBA demand. 
However, the City has not filed any exceptions to that aspect of 
the ALT's decision. 
Board - U-18672 -3 
its part concedes that its eligibility determination is subject 
to review, but only pursuant to CPLR Article 78. 
CPLR Article 78 is certainly a proper mechanism by which an 
aggrieved person may obtain review of a governmental 
determination. But that does not mean, as the City argues, that 
CPLR Article 78 is the exclusive review mechanism, or that CPLR 
Article 78 prohibits the negotiation of an alternative method of 
review or exempts the City from its bargaining obligations under 
the Act. Nothing in the CPLR, the GML or any other statute would 
lead to the conclusion urged upon us by the City. 
As the ALJ observed in his decision, and as the PBA notes in 
its arguments in response to the City's exceptions, the 
conclusion that a demand for the arbitration of disputes 
involving GML §207-c eligibility determinations is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation is wholly consistent with relevant 
decisions by the Court of Appeals-7 and our own decisions 
regarding the negotiability of GML §207-c procedures.-7 The 
City no more has an indefeasible right to a review of a GML 
^Citv of Schenectady v. PERB. 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB 17005 
(1995); Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby. 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 12 
PERB f7006 (1979), aff'q 62 A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB 17003 (3d Dep't 
1978) (arbitration as an alternative to statutory disciplinary 
procedures not prohibited by law or policy). 
^See, e.g., Town of Cortlandt, 30 PERB 13031, conf7d, 30 PERB 
17012 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1997). In confirming, the Court 
noted the State's strong policy favoring collective bargaining 
and observed that submission to the bargaining process of the 
many and varied GML §207-c procedures in issue in that case 
"would not have any adverse effect upon [the municipality's] 
ability to exercise any of the rights which.it is afforded under 
GML §207-c." 
/ 
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§207-c eligibility determination under CPLR Article 78 than did 
the employer in Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby^7 have an 
absolute right to review of its disciplinary determinations only 
pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. Those statutory mechanisms 
for review of governmental action are merely the ones made 
available by law to aggrieved persons in the absence of an 
alternative means of review, which can be created pursuant to the 
negotiations required by the Act. 
Although the cases relied upon by the PBA and the ALJ are 
themselves dispositive of the issue presented to us, Local 589, 
IAFF v. City of Newburah (hereafter Newburah)-7 removes any 
doubt as to the mandatory negotiability of the PBA's demand. In 
Newburah. the Court, against an alleged public policy 
prohibition, held valid that portion of an interest arbitration 
award that had a private physician selected jointly by the 
employer and union decide GML §207-a eligibility disputes. GML 
§207-a is a fire fighter disability statute comparable in all 
relevant respects to GML §207-c, which covers police officers. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court in Newburah specifically 
analogized a delegation of the decision-making authority to a 
physician to a delegation of such authority to an arbitrator. 
According to the majority of the Court, as delegation to an 
arbitrator was plainly permitted by law and policy, delegation to 
) 
^Supra note 2. 
^116 A.D.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1986) 
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a physician was also permitted, there being "no basis in the 
statutes for any public policy against delegation.I,z/ Newburgh, 
therefore, unquestionably endorses the use of arbitration as a 
means to review GML §207-c eligibility determinations. As GML 
§207-c provides no procedural framework for determining whether 
an employee has been disabled in the line of duty, and as such 
eligibility determinations clearly affect terms and conditions of 
employment, a demand for a dispute resolution procedure ending in 
arbitration, which permits for subsequent judicial review under 
CPLR Article 75, rather than review under CPLR Article 78, is 
mandatorily negotiable. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AU's decision 
regarding the PBA's demand for arbitration of disputes involving 
GML §207-c eligibility determinations is affirmed and the City's 
exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that this charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
^Id. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4627 
MANCHESTER-SHORTSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
BRENT D. COOLEY, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) seeks to appeal a ruling by the" Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
ordering an election to determine CSEA's majority status in a 
unit of employees of the Manchester-Shortsville Central School 
District (District). CSEA alleges that it has demonstrated its 
majority status in the unit found to be appropriate through dues 
deduction authorization cards and affidavits attesting to the 
continuing validity of those cards and should, therefore, be 
certified without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules). The Director ordered the election 
largely because approximately sixteen employees, some of whom had 
signed the authorization cards which CSEA used to establish its 
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majority status, withdrew their authorizations and/or stated 
their desire to have an election.-7 
CSEA argues that the District intentionally delayed the 
processing of the representation petition by raising frivolous 
objections to the composition of the unit-7 to "subvert the 
majority showing of interest" which the Director had earlier 
determined it had made.-7 CSEA alleges that it was the District 
which sought and obtained the letters from employees which caused 
the Director to order an election. 
Even were we inclined to grant permission for this 
interlocutory appeal,-7 the Director's ruling ordering an 
]-7The Director's ruling, itself confirming a ruling by the 
assigned Administrative Law Judge, refers to "numerous facts" 
without further specification. 
-
7The dispute centered on the appropriate placement of the title 
of teacher assistant. Affirming the Director, we concluded in 
October 1997 that teacher assistants were most appropriately 
included in a teacher unit currently represented by the Red 
Jacket Faculty Association. 30 PERB f3050, aff'g 30 PERB f4019 
(1997) . 
-
7The Director's determination that CSEA had majority status was 
made in August 1997, at a time when the District's exceptions to 
the Director's uniting determination were pending before us. 
Upon discovery of the exceptions, the Director retracted his 
majority status determination. After our decision in October 
affirming the Director's unit determination, CSEA submitted an 
affidavit attesting to the continuing validity of the prior 
showing of majority status. It was then that the District 
submitted an affidavit opposing certification without an election 
which relied upon the employees' letters. 
-
7Appeal is by permission only pursuant to §201.9(c)(4). See 
Town of Putnam Valley, 28 PERB f3049 (1995) (motion seeking 
permission to appeal ruling regarding the sufficiency of a 
showing of interest denied); State of New York, 11 PERB H3097 
(1978) (motion seeking permission to appeal a ruling ordering an 
election denied). 
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election is not reviewable. Under §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules, a 
determination by the Director that "the indications of employee 
support are not sufficient for certification without an election 
is a ministerial act and will not be reviewed by the board." 
Our decision denying CSEA permission to appeal the 
Director's ruling ordering the election is not a determination on 
the merit of CSEA's allegations regarding the District's actions. 
Those allegations may be relevant to a consideration of election 
objections or an improper practice charge. Those allegations, 
even if true, do not permit for review of the Director's ruling 
ordering an election after his determination that CSEA's majority 
status evidences were not sufficient for certification without an 
election because that ruling is expressly insulated by rule from 
our review at any time. We also express no opinion as to whether 
CSEA is entitled to view the employees' letters, whether in 
redacted or unredacted form. There is nothing before us to 
indicate that CSEA made a request of the Director to view the 
employees' letters or that the Director denied any such request. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's motion to appeal the 
Director's ruling ordering an election in this case is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York A 
. Kins,ella, Chairperson 
AA-a.i:c A. AbKott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4674 
TOWN OF CICERO, 
Employer. 
WILL STREETER, for Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ. P.C. (CRAIG 
ATLAS of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 23, 1997, the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town of 
Cicero. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: 
SEE ATTACHMENT A 
Excluded: 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on November 21, 1997, at which a majority of ballots were 
o ca'st against representation by the petitioner. 
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Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
ATTACHMENT A 
Deputy Receiver of Taxes, Clerk to Town Justice, Codes 
Enforcement; Officer, Deputy Codes Enforcement Officer, Typist 
I, Clerk I, Clerk II, Stenographer I, Dog Control Officer, 
Recreation Supervisor, Park Maintenance Crew Leader, Park 
Laborer (Assistant to Park Maintenance Crew Leader), 
Recreation Attendant (Senior Coordinator), Recreation 
Attendent (Assistant Senior Center Coordinator); 
Highway Superintendent, Assistant Highway Superintendent, 
Secretary to Town Highway Superintendent, Town Supervisor, 
Town Council Members, Deputy Town Supervisor, Assessor, 
Secretary to Town Supervisor, Town Clerk, Deputy Town Clerk, 
Comptroller, Receiver of Taxes, Budget Officer, Town Justice, 
Director of Recreation, Codes Enforcement Officer-Department 
Head, Account Clerk II and Account Clerk III in Town 
Comptroller's Office, all titles and positions in the Town of 
Cicero Highway collective bargaining unit and the Town of 
Cicero Police Department collective bargaining unit, all 
seasonal, temporary and. casual employees of the Town of 
Cicero and all other employees. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF LOCKPORT DEPARTMENT HEADS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4526 
CITY OF LOCKPORT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been,conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public-
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the City of Lockport Department 
Heads has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit defined 
by order and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Youth and Recreation Director, Building 
Maintenance Superintendent, Highways and Parks 
Superintendent, Community Development Director, 
Director of Utilities, Chief Building 
Inspector, Assessor, Director of Engineering. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the City of Lockport Department 
Heads. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 11, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Marc C. Abbott, Member 
It 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
> In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
LOCAL 4053, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4645 
OSWEGO COUNTY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Public 
Employees Federation, Local 4053 has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Administrative Assistant for Human Services, 
Administrative Secretary, Airport Manager, 
Assistant County Attorney, Assistant Director 
of Veterans Services, Assistant Highway 
Engineer, Assistant to Director of Emergency 
Management, Building Operations Supervisor, 
Chief Maintenance Mechanic (ERF), County 
Historian, Coordinator of Client Services, 
Coordinator of Mental Health Services, Deputy 
Commissioner of Health Services, Deputy 
Director of Planning, Deputy Probation 
Director, Deputy Superintendent of Public 
Works/Eq. & Anc. Serv., Deputy Superintendent 
of Public Works/Solid Waste, Deputy 
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Superintendent of Public Works/ERF, Director of 
Administrative Services, Director of Employment 
and Training, Director of Environmental Health, 
Director of Income Maintenance, Director of 
Nursing Services (AMNH), Director of Patient 
Services, Director of Social Services, Director 
of Weights and Measures, Executive Assistant 
for Human Services, Highway Engineer, 
Housekeeper (AMNH), Motor Vehicle Bureau 
Supervisor, Plant Engineer (ERF), Public Health 
Engineer, Public Information Coordinator, 
Public Information Officer, Registered 
Professional Nurse (AMNH), Secretary to Family 
Court Attorney, Secretary to Superintendent for 
Public Works/Highway, Shift Supervisor (ERF), 
Solid Waste Engineer, Solid Waste Program 
Coordinator, Supervising Public Health Nurse, 
STOP DWI Coordinator, Telephone Coordinator, 
Transfer Station Supervisor. 
Excluded: Assistant County Attorney (labor relations) and 
all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Public 
Employees Federation, Local 4053. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the.making 
of a concession. 
DATED: December 11,1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella^, "Chairperson 
Aid /u/~ 
/
 Marc A. Abbott, Member 
